Logical Fallacy: Appeal to Metaphysics

Prof. Ernst von Glasersfeld argues that metaphysics is an irrational level of philosophy and I tend to agree with him. I wouldn't however go to the extremes of logical positivism and suggest that metaphysics is entirely useless; it isn't, as Karl Popper explains of the atomic theory of the ancient Greeks. The ancient Greek metaphysical atomic theory inspired and encouraged the development of a scientific atomic theory.

Still, I think metaphysics is utterly useless for making knowledge claims. Take for example subjectivist and objectivist metaphysical knowledge claims respectively.

"The chair exists as I observe it because I observe it!" "Really? So you can demonstrate that the chair was not there when there was nobody there to observe it not being there?"

"The chair is real - it continues to exist independent of observation" "Really? You observed the chair existing while nobody was observing it? How very clever!"

Kant makes a great deal out of recognising the need for a metaphysic of morals and I have to say that I disagree. No metaphysical claim to morality can withstand rational demands for justification. That is to say that metaphysical morals are couched in a philosophy that resists verification, and as such can only be seen to be as valid as any other metaphysical claim.

If you want to make knowledge claims, turn to epistemology. I would argue that when one accepts rational thinking as a priori, not out of metaphysics but out of self-evidence, an epistemological basis for moral reasoning exists, provided the epistemology does not make recourse to metaphysics by necessity.

So which epistemologies make recourse to metaphysics? Some breeds of constructivism need to. Metaphysical constructivism/subjectivism certainly. I'm am dubious of social constructivism because it makes presuppositions as to shared (epistemological) realities that quite frankly are challenged by reason; just how big is a culture? How many individuals make up a culture in order to share its constructs? What happens when someone dissents? What happens if you suddenly wind up on a dessert island all alone?

More importantly, how do you know that the version that person X perceives of the "shared" construct is the same as person Y? You don't. You can't. Yet the very notion of a social construct requires that it exists in the minds of more than one person unless all cultures are made up of a single person. That is of course unless you make a metaphysical claim that the construct is shared, which like the subjectivist or objectivist chairs, is bunk. Instrumentalist bunk.

On the other side of the spectrum of epistemologies, we have the hardcore realists. The objectivists (both epistemological objectivists and Ayn Rand objectivists.) They believe that ontological reality exists and that it is knowable. An assertion that like the existence of the objectivist chair, they can not prove. Ayn Rand objectivists will go even further, often resorting to dubious circular logic to prove it.

It is an objective fact that Ayn Rand is the greatest woman in history. Ayn Rand says that she is the greatest woman in history. She must be right because she is the greatest woman in history, therefore her greatness is an objective fact. Or in the common toungue; it's true because I say so! It is! It is! IT IS!!! Funny isn't it, how when you ask for a proof, just how much serious objectivism resembles subjectivism?

This of course brings us to the fallacy of the Appeal to Metaphysics. It is a fallacy akin to appeal to emotion in that, one can state something is an ontological fact when in fact, like the objectivist chair, they can not verify its ontological reality. It is usually considered common sense that the chair exists, and through this common sense, the intuition, the emotion of the listener is appealed to.

Now every day Joe may think this isn't a big deal. Joe wants to sit down, and so far, ten times out of ten, when sitting down, his chair has indeed existed even though obscured by his ample posterior. Why bother to question it? Well not everything is as straight forward or reliable as sitting down in a chair. Take science.

Neo-Newtonians of a leaning towards scientism, sometimes have the nasty habit to accept robust scientific theories as capable of more than just explaining some aspect of the Universe. It's a scientific fact! Indeed, it is this kind of reasoning that told us that space couldn't be warped by massive objects. The general theory of relativity conflicted with Neo-Newtonian dogma.

You see it in advertisements for bodybuilding supplements. "X builds muscle!" Does X build muscle, or does it actually do something unobserved that in some cases leads to an increase in muscle mass? The acceptance that X builds muscle as ontological fact, can be quite misleading (even when not a snake oil claim) and this is often discovered when further knowledge of a mechanism of action is discovered.

This of course brings us back to the example of Newtonian gravity. If Newton's clockwork Universe was an ontological fact, how then has newer contrary science been more resilient to the acid test? Did ontological fact suddenly up and change because we have a new theory? There we have the old objectivism becomes subjectivism problem that plagues the followers of Ayn Rand.

Now claims couched in metaphysical constructivism/subjectivism are equally unsound. "There is a flying pig in the sky because I/we can see it!" or "it is true because I/we say so!" Clearly a fallacious form of argument if ever I saw one. Like the objectivist appeal to metaphysics, this lends as much justification to a knowledge claim as stamping one's foot. More than one subjectivist epistemology makes this mistake.

I hope this gives you some insight into what I'm calling the fallacy of "Appeal to Metaphysics". If you want to avoid it and couch your knowledge claims in something a little more sound, I suggest you be discerning in your choice of epistemology so that you don't have to make such appeals.